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Abstract
There has been considerable discussion of the claim by Stapp [1]
that quantum theory is incompatible with locality. In this note I ana-
lyze the meaning of some of the statements used in this discussion.
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Stapp has claimed to have proven that quantum theory is incompatible
with relativistic causality [1]. This claim has been criticized by Unruh [2]
and by Mermin [3, 4], and Stapp has replied to this criticism, in [5, 6, 7].
Stapp’s proof involves a statement (to be explained below) which I will
denote by S(L2). Stapp claims to show that S(L2) is true, that an analogous
statement S(L1) is false, and that this difference in the truth-values of S(L2)
and S(L1) constitutes a violation of a locality condition he calls LOC2.
Unruh and Mermin state that they agree that S(L2) is true; thus the dispute
between Stapp and his two critics would seem to involve the relation between
S(L2) and S(L1), and, in particular, the meaning and applicability of LOC2.
However, as I will point out in this note, the agreement on S(L2) is illusory;
the version of S(L2) agreed to by Unruh and Mermin does not have the
same meaning as does S(L2) as understood by Stapp. In this note I will
discuss the meaning of S(L2).
In ref. [1], Stapp considers two particles in the (entangled) Hardy state
[8], on which measurements can be performed in two spacelike-separated
regions called Right and Left. On the Right, measurement is made of either
of two non-compatible properties called R1 and R2; similarly, on the Left
either L1 or L2 is measured. The result of any given measurement is either
+ or −. The statement I call S(L2) is the statement that, if L2 is measured,
a statement called S is true; in symbols
S(L2) := [L2⇒ S] (1)
(similarly, S(L1) := [L1⇒ S]), where S is defined by
S := “If R2 is measured and yields the result +, then
if R1 had been measured it would have yielded the result −”(2)
Now, what exactly does S mean? In this (counterfactual) statement, one
is describing an “actual” world, in which R2 is measured, and a “hypothet-
ical” world in which, instead, R1 is measured; S then is the assertion that,
in the hypothetical world, the result of R1 would necessarily be −. For this
to make sense, it is necessary for the hypothetical world to be specified more
fully. Roughly speaking, the idea is to specify that, except for the replace-
ment of R2 by R1, the hypothetical world agrees closely with the actual
world; S then is the assertion that, in every world that fits the specification,
the result of R1 is −. And so to complete the definition of S, it is necessary
to specify exactly in which ways the hypothetical world is required to agree
with the actual world.
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Here is one way to make the specification: to demand that the hypo-
thetical world agree with the actual world on all events which are not in
the invariant future of the measurement on the Right (that is, on all events
either spacelike-separated from, or else on or within the backward lightcone
from, that measurement). Let F denote this set of events (which are behind
the Forward lightcone), and then define SF to be this version of S:
SF := “If R2 is measured and yields the result +, then
in every world which agrees with the actual world on F
(in particular, which agrees with the actual Left result)
and in which R1 rather than R2 is measured,
the result of R1 is −.” (3)
It is not important whether or not the definition (3) agrees with what most
people would mean by the statement S; what is important is to have a
clearly-defined definition for S. Of course, (3) might be motivated by phys-
ical principles such as causality, and those principles might be relevant in
proving that SF is true in some particular case; nevertheless, (3) is just a
definition, and we are free to chose a different definition if we like. Here is
an example of a different definition: we could specify that the hypothetical
world must agree with the actual world on all events in the invariant past
of the measurement on the Right. Let B denote that set of events (behind
the Backward lightcone), and SB that version of S:
SB := “If R2 is measured and yields the result +, then
in every world which agrees with the actual world on B
and in which R1 rather than R2 is measured,
the result of R1 is −.” (4)
SF and SB are not identical statements (truth of SB implies truth of SF ,
but not the other way around). No physical principle can tell us whether
either (3) or (4) give the “correct” meaning for S, since definitions cannot
be “correct”. I certainly do not mean to assert that SB captures the usual
meaning of S, nor do I mean to suggest SB as a useful alternative to SF . I
have introduced SB merely to emphasize that, to be unambiguous, statement
S must include a specification of the ways in which the hypothetical world
is required to agree with the actual world, and to suggest that it is a good
idea to spell out that specification as completely as possible.
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So far, I have discussed the meaning of statement S; for that discussion,
the quantum state of the two particles was completely irrelevant. To discuss
the conditions under which S is true, it will be necessary to remember that
the particles are in the Hardy state [8]. Let SF (L2) denote S(L2) in which
S is understood as SF ; that is,
SF (L2) := [L2⇒ SF ], (5)
with analogous definitions for SB(L2), SF (L1), andSB(L1). It happens that,
for particles in the Hardy state, SF (L2) is true, and SB(L2), SF (L1), and
SB(L1) are all false.
• To see that SF (L2) is true, note that a quantum calculation
2 shows,
for the actual world of SF (L2) (in which L2 and R2 are measured and
the result of R2 is +), that the result of L2 is necessarily +. Since
SF constrains the hypothetical world to agree with the actual world
on the Left, in the hypothetical world that result is also +. Then a
quantum calculation for this hypothetical world (in which L2 and R1
are measured, and the result of L2 is +) requires the result of R1 to
be −. Note that no locality assumption is needed here; the truth of
SF (L2) follows simply from its definition and the quantum properties
of the Hardy state.
• To see that SB(L2) is false, note that, again, in the actual world the
result of L2 is +. Now, however, we are free to consider a hypothetical
world in which the result of L2 is −, and in such a world (L2 and R1
measured, result of L2 is −), a quantum calculation reveals a non-zero
probability for the result of R1 to be +. Thus there is a hypothetical
world consistent with the specification of SB(L2) in which the result
of R1 is +; therefore SB(L2) is false. Now it may seem strange to
allow a hypothetical world in which the result of L2 is −, while in
the actual world that result is +; after all, how could the decision to
measure R1 rather than R2 change the result on the Left? It may help
to remember that a hypothetical world is, ipso facto, not the same as
the actual world. If I choose to talk about a hypothetical world, then
I get to choose what world to talk about; if I (perhaps foolishly) were
to adopt SB as representing the meaning of S, then I could find an
allowed hypothetical world in which the result of R1 is +.
2The quantum predictions for the measurements we are discussing, for particles in the
Hardy state, are presented in refs. [1, 2, 3].
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• For completeness, we can see that SF (L1) is false by noting that in
the actual world (L1 and R2 measured, result of R2 is +), it is allowed
that the result of L1 be −. Then in the hypothetical world (L1 and
R1 measured, result of L1 is −), the result of R1 is allowed to be +.
Finally, since SF (L1) is false, SB(L1) must be false also.
Again, I am certainly not advocating adopting SB to represent the meaning
of S. I am suggesting that, whatever we wish S to mean, it is useful to spell
out that meaning explicitly, by specifying the ways in which the hypothetical
world is required to agree with the actual world.
Mermin, in ref. [3], denotes by (I) the statement here called S(L2).
From his discussion of why he considers this statement to be true, it is clear
that Mermin requires the hypothetical world to agree with the actual world
on all events which, in some frame, occur earlier than the measurement
on the Right. Since for every event in the set we have called F there is
a frame in which that event does precede the measurement on the Right,
Mermin’s understanding of S(L2) coincides with SF (L2). Although Unruh
[2] does not give general criteria for the interpretation of counterfactuals,
in his discussion of statement S(L2) (which appears in eqs. 12 and 13 of
ref. [2]) he strongly emphasizes that this statement must be understood
as requiring that the result of L2 be +, and that is the aspect of SF (L2)
which is relevant for all the further discussion of locality. Stapp[1, 5, 6, 7],
however, evidently interprets S(L2) differently. For him, the meaning of
S (as opposed to the conditions required for its proof) involves only the
Right region; he writes, for example [6] “This ‘meaning’ of statement S is
strictly in terms of a relationship between the possibilities for the outcomes
of alternative possible experiments both of which are confined to the region
R(ight).” So statement S for Stapp is not the same as SF (and incidentally,
not the same as SB either); thus statement S is used to mean different things
by Stapp and by his two critics.
Of course, the issue is not which is the “correct” meaning of statement
S—that is, after all, just a matter of definition.3 The issue is whether quan-
tum mechanics is incompatible with relativistic locality. But it is difficult
to discuss that issue without unambiguous and agreed-upon definitions for
the statements which are being discussed.
3Humpty Dumpty has remarked [9] “When I use a word it means just what I choose
it to mean—neither more nor less.”
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